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ing purporting to be a complete binding contract. It would
seem to assume the very question in issue by giving effect to
a provision of the writing when the question is whether the provisions of the writing collectively and severally are to be given
effect at all. Certainly if the provision is to be given conclusive
effect, as apparently is intended, this objection is valid. However, if the provision may be considered as evidentiary merely,
the rule is desirable in directing attention to it. The provision
should be utilized in court as an admission or a prior inconsistent statement of the party seeking to establish the condition precedent.' 6 (Footnotes omitted.)
David J. Kozma

CRIMINAL LAw-DISCLOSURE OF IDENTITY OF EYEWITNESS INFORMER-

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that the governmental
privilege' to refrain from disclosing the identity of an informer does not
limit the duty of the prosecution to make available the name and whereabouts of all material eyewitnesses to the defense.
Commonwealth v. Carter,427 Pa. 53, 233 A.2d 284 (1967).
Norton Wilder, an undercover agent for the Philadelphia Police force and
the prosecution's principal witness testified that he went to a street corner
in Philadelphia where he was introduced to the appellant, Carter. Wilder
was accompanied by an informer and both were under the surveillance
of a federal narcotics agent. Wilder testified that after being introduced
to the appellant, the appellant sold heroin to the informer in the presence
of Wilder. The agent for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics testified that he
saw Wilder, appellant, and the informer conversing at the scene of the
alleged sale. The agent, who was sitting in an automobile parked a half
block away, stated that he did not see the transaction but that he did
recognize the appellant.
The appellant was arrested two months after the alleged sale and
indicted for the felonious possession and sale of narcotic drugs. At the
jury trial counsel for appellant asked Wilder to disclose the name of the
informant. The prosecution objected and the trial judge sustained the
objection. The defense at the close of the Commonwealth's case made a
motion to have the case dismissed because of the Commonwealth's failure
16. Id.
1. In n.3, at 56 of 427 Pa. 53, and at 285 of 233 A.2d 284 (1967), it is stated that
"neither statute nor appellate decision in Pennsylvania has yet recognized such a privilege.
To simplify the issues in this appeal, we have assumed without deciding such a privilege
exists."
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to provide the defense with the name and whereabouts of the informer.
The motion was denied.
Carter's entire defense was his claim of mistaken identity, alleging that
he never sold the narcotics, and had never met Wilder prior to the arrest.
When the trial judge charged the jury he called to their attention the
absence of a material witness, and said that they were to infer that if such
a witness did take the stand his testimony would not aid the Commonwealth. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and Carter received a five
to ten year sentence. The case was appealed to the Superior Court which
affirmed, two judges dissenting.2 Carter then filed a petition for allowance
to appeal which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted.
In the instant decision the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed
and granted a new trial. Justice Roberts, speaking for a unanimous court,
ruled that the refusal of the Commonwealth to disclose the name of the
informer when the informer is a material eye-witness constituted reversible error. The unanimous court based its holding on two significant
factors: (1) a Pennsylvania rule which requires the prosecution to make
the names and whereabouts of material eye-witnesses available to the
defense,' and (2) the case of Roviaro v. United States,4 a United States
Supreme Court case which established certain guidelines in the disclosure
of informer's area.
Justice Roberts began his opinion by stating that, "Pennsylvania decisions have long recognized that . . . the prosecution is not absolutely

bound to call to the stand all available and material eyewitnesses."' The
first case which affirmatively 6 recognized such a rule was Commonwealth
v. Dietrick,7 where the District Attorney called an eyewitness to the
stand whose testimony conflicted with another eyewitness's testimony.
The trial judge then permitted the District Attorney to call witnesses who
testified that the conflicting eyewitness had previously told them a story
that agreed with the testimony of the other eyewitness. In the trial judge's
charge to the jury, he stated that a District Attorney must call all eye2. 208 Pa. Super. 245, 222 A.2d 475 (1966). The dissenting Judges were Jacobs and
Hoffman.
3. See nn. 10-16 infra and accompanying text.
4. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
5. 427 Pa. at 54-5, 233 A.2d at 285.
6. There is an 1880 case, Donaldson v. Commonwealth, 95 Pa. 21 (1880), where an
appeal was made to the Supreme Court on numerous assignments of error, one of which
was that the prosecution did not call the examining doctor as a witness. The Supreme Court
reversed on other grounds, and there was no holding as to the duty of the prosecution to
call witnesses, although the court voiced an opinion that the prosecution should have called
such a witness. Also in the case of Commonwealth v. Danz, 211 Pa. 507, 60 A. 1070 (1905),
the court held the prosecution need not call a doctor as a witness, however, the doctor
was not a material eyewitness.
7. 221 Pa. 7, 70 A. 275 (1908).
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witnesses. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that they
were not reversing for reasons concerning the trial judge's charge, but
said "an expression of view seems to be required,"' because of various
misconceptions by District Attorneys in regard to a. "supposed rule" in
criminal law which requires the state to call all eyewitnesses. "The impression that there is such a rule very widely obtains, but it is without
judicial sanction. The disregard of it, if it ever existed, never of itself
resulted in reversal." ' The court then stated its position on the matter:
"In all such cases very much must be left to the discretion of the District
Attorney, under the general direction of the trial judge. There may be...
justifying if not compelling reasons why a prosecution officer should not
be required to call each and every eyewitness."'" A rule of law thus
rapidly evolved from "an expression of view."
In Carter Justice Roberts, after stating that the prosecution is not
bound to call all material witnesses, then went on to say that if the
prosecution does not call an eyewitness to the stand, "it must apprise
the defense of the witnesses' name and whereabouts at trial . . .,,"
The first case which suggests such a rule in Pennsylvania was Commonwealth v. Danz." In Danz there was an assignment of error to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania relating to the alleged misconduct of the
District Attorney. The District Attorney failed to call a medical doctor
who had examined the body, but whose report to the coroner did not
shed any light on the case. Early in the trial, the District Attorney informed the defense that he was not going to call the doctor, and that if
the defense thought the doctor would be useful he (defense) could call
him to the stand. The court stated their opinion as to whether the District Attorney had performed his duty satisfactorily: "His full duty to
the prisoner was discharged when he notified her that he would not call
him, coupled with the notice that she must do so if she thought his testimony would help her."' 8 Thus Danz seems to say that when the prosecution in their discretion decides not to call a witness that they must so
inform the defense of their action. A later case, Commonwealth v. Horn,4
seems to state such a rule which is more closely linked with Justice
Roberts' statement of the rule. In Horn the court stated both rules to
which Justice Roberts refers in the instant opinion:
There is no duty on the Commonwealth to call witnesses whose
names appear on a Bill of Indictment or even eyewitnesses
8.Id. at 14, 70 A. at 277.
9. Id., 70 A. at 278.
10. Id.
11. 427 Pa. at 55, 233 A.2d at 285.
12. 211 Pa. 507, 60 A. 107 (1905).
13. Id. at 522, 60 A. at 1075.
14. 395 Pa. 585, 150 A.2d 872 (1959).
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S. .. The law in such a case merely requires a District Attorney to notify the court and defense counsel that he does not
intend to call certain persons whose names appear on the bill
of indictment as Commonwealth witnesses .... 15

However, there is one discrepancy between the above statement and
Justice Roberts' statement, that being the reference in Horn to all persons whose names are on the Bill of Indictment. The informer eyewitness's name in the instant case did not appear on the Bill of Indictment,
and this was noted in the Superior Court opinion 6 but not in the instant
opinion. Thus the cases cited to support the rule that the prosecution
must apprise the defense of the names and whereabouts of an eyewitness
if they are not going to call them might be distinguished on the ground
that they only applied to cases where the witness's name appeared on
the indictment as a witness for the Commonwealth. However, Justice
Roberts in Carter does not rely heavily on the rule discussed supra, but
appears to place primary reliance on the United States Supreme Court
case of Roviaro,17 as indicated by his statement that, "[t]hose aspects
of the Roviaro test which concern the value of the informer's testimony
to the accused point clearly toward reversal . . .,,i
In Roviaro the defendant was convicted for knowingly possessing and
transporting illegally imported heroin. The government refused to disclose the identity of an undercover informer who had taken a material
part in bringing about defendant's possession of the drugs, who had been
present with defendant at the occurrence of the alleged crime, and who
might have been a material witness as to whether defendant knowingly
transported the drugs. The trial court sustained the government's refusal
to disclose the informer's name, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in order to pass upon the propriety of the nondisclosure of the informer's
identity. Justice Burton said that what is usually called the informer's
privilege is really the government's privilege "to withhold from disclosure
the identity of persons who furnished information of violations to officers . . . " 9 Burton went on to state that the purpose of such a privilege "is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective
law enforcement . . . . The scope of the privilege is limited by its underlying purpose."2" Justice Burton discussed the various limitations on
15. Id. at 589, 150 A.2d at 874.
16. Commonwealth v. Carter, 208 Pa. Super. at 247, 251, 222 A.2d at 476, 478 (1966).
17. In n.4, at 57 of 427 Pa. 53, and 286 of 233 A.2d 284 (1967), the court in the
instant case said that Roviaro "was an exercise of the United States Supreme Court's supervisory power over federal courts, rather than a constitutional ruling .... Thus, Roviaro
is not technically binding on us." The court went on to say that they were impelled "to
accept Roviaro as highly persuasive authority."
18. 427 Pa. at 59, 233 A.2d at 287.
19. 353 U.S. at 59.
20. Id.
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the privilege and stated that the basic limitation is the necessity of "fairness"; "fairness" in the sense that when a situation arises where an informer's appearance may aid the defense, then such privilege shall be
non-existent. Justice Burton provided what has come to be known as the
Roviaro test, a test which Justice Roberts heavily relied on in the instant
case:
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public
interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance
renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime
charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the
informer's testimony, and other relevant factors.2 '
Justice Roberts in discussing the Roviaro test stated that "[t]hose
aspects of the Roviaro test which concern the value of the informer's
testimony to the accused point clearly toward reversal ... ."'I Roberts
applied the facts in Carter to the test as expounded by Justice Burton
and decided that "[w]e believe that a consideration of the possible defenses' and of 'the possible significance of the informer's testimony' weigh
the balance heavily in favor of reversal."2 Roberts throughout his opinion placed much emphasis on the fact that the policeman's identification
of Carter was based on one observation. Roberts proceeded to include
this factor in his interpretation of the test in Roviaro and reasoned that
the balance weighed heavily in the defendant's favor. Roberts concluded
his comparison of Roviaro and Carter by stating that the Pennsylvania
rule alone would require reversal: "For much the same reasoning we
have little doubt that the Pennsylvania rule requiring the prosecution to
make the names and whereabouts of material eyewitnesses available to
the defense, at least when considered in isolation, requires reversal of
the instant conviction." 24 Thus the rationale of Roberts in construing
the facts of the instant case would require reversal based on the Roviaro
test, and, or based on the Pennsylvania rule, as stated by Roberts, requiring the prosecution to make the names of material eyewitnesses
available.
The Commonwealth in seeking a nondisclosure rule that would protect
informers such as the one in the instant case made three arguments. First,
they sought to distinguish Roviaro, second, they argued that public policy
demands nondisclosure in Carter-type cases, and third, that even if disclosure was required it would in no event aid the defendant.
21. Id. at 60-2.
22. 427 Pa. at 59, 233 A.2d at 287.

23. Id. at 60, 233 A.2d at 287.
24. Id.
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The Commonwealth, in seeking to distinguish Roviaro, stated that the
experience of law enforcement officers since the 1957 decision in Roviaro
required "an extremely restrictive reading of the case and of our established Pennsylvania rule."2 5 Roberts' view was that the only significant
distinction is the fact that in Roviaro the informer was the only eyewitness to the entire transaction and in the instant case the informer
was not. The Commonwealth contended that this distinction was significant enough to be substantiated by three lower federal court decisions
which interpreted Roviaro.26 In United States v. Simonetti 7 the defendant appealed to the Second Circuit from a judgment of conviction for
wilfully failing to pay a tax which was imposed on persons engaging in
the business of gambling and urged reversal "because the trial judge
refused to compel the Government to reveal the identity of the "Special
Employee" who introduced the agent who placed the bets."2 In a per
curiam opinion the court said in citing Roviaro that disclosure of a
"Special Employee" is required "only when necessary for a fair disposition of the case,"2 9 and that the testimony of the 'Special Employee'
would have been merely cumulative. Justice Roberts said this case did
not turn on the sole eyewitness distinction, because the court in Simonetti
did not say why the informer's testimony would have been cumulative.8"
In Washington v. United States8 the court did not discuss Roviaro or
mention the factor of one eyewitness, so that case had no relevance to
the instant case. Roberts said that in Washington, "the sole issue was
whether the government was itself required to call him to the witness
stand." 2 In United States v. Coke8" the defendant contended on appeal
that the trial court erred when they sustained the government's objection
to defense counsel questioning of a government agent seeking disclosure
of an informer who allegedly had introduced the agent to the defendant.
Judge Anderson of the Second Circuit stated that other witnesses had
identified the defendant and that "absent a showing by the defense at
the trial that the disclosure of the informer's name and address was
necessary for a fair disposition of the case, the testimony of the informer
may be assumed to have been, at best, merely cumulative."8 4 The court
25. Id., 233 A.2d at 288.
26. United States v. Coke, 339 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1964). United States v. Simonetti,
326 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1964). Washington v. United States, 275 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1960).
27. 326 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1964).
28. Id. at 615.
29. Id. at 616.
30. In Simonetti the facts are not given in such detail that any real credence can be

given to that decision on the basis of a sole eyewitness distinction. The court there merely
said that such testimony would be cumulative.
31. 275 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1960).
32. 427 Pa. at 61, 233 A.2d at 288.
33. 339 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1964).
34. Id. at 184.
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in making this statement was relying on Simonetti and Roviaro. In Coke
the informer waited on the sidewalk outside the building where the narcotics sale was going on so that he was not present to observe the entire
transaction as was the informer in the instant case. Justice Roberts, after
a careful reviewing of the three federal cases concluded that: "Considered
apart from recent federal interpretations of the rule, we believe the fact
that police had a somewhat better opportunity to observe the alleged
crime . . .here than in Roviaro is not a circumstance sufficient to justify
nondisclosure in the instant trial."85 Roberts then stated that the supreme
court is reluctant to permit the establishment of crucial facts solely on
the basis of a single observation by a police officer "where testimony
from a more disinterested source is available."8 The Commonwealth also
sought to distinguish Roviaro by saying "that any prejudice caused to
Carter by the failure to disclose the informer's identity was cured by the

jury charge . . .whereas no such charge was given in Roviaro.'8

7

Rob-

erts easily dismissed this argument by saying that such a charge "falls
pitifully short of being an adequate substitute for the testimony of the
informer."8 8
In considering the Commonwealth's public policy argument (favoring
nondisclosure of informers) Roberts indicated that this argument had
more merit than the Commonwealth's attempt to distinguish Roviaro.
The Commonwealth relied on a report by the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice entitled, The Challenge
of Crime in a Free Society. In the report the Commission stated that,
"there are only sellers and willing buyers. The enforcement officers must
therefore initiate cases."8 The report outlines the technique used in enforcing narcotic laws, stating that the necessity of using informers is
absolutely essential to effective law enforcement in this area. 0 The Commonwealth based its policy arguments on a similar rationale, and supplemented it by explaining that once an informer's identity is made known
his usefulness to law enforcement agencies ceases. The Commonwealth
concluded this analysis with the statement that the policy argument in
and of itself demands that there be a "broader privilege to withhold disclosure of an eyewitness informer in narcotics trials than would normally
obtain."'" Justice Roberts countered this argument by saying that the
safeguards for an individual charged with a crime should not be relaxed
because that individual is charged with a specific crime. Roberts concluded by stating, "we find it impossible to accept the contention that
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

427 Pa. at 61, 233 A.2d at 288.
Id.
Id. at 62, 233 A.2d at 288.
Id., 233 A.2d at 289.
At p. 218 of the Report.
Id.
427 Pa. at 63, 233 A.2d at 280.
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the peculiar problems surrounding enforcement of the narcotic laws should
play a part in our determination of the scope of the prosecution's duty
to disclose to the defense the identity of material eyewitnesses .... 2."
The Commonwealth's final argument was simply that even if disclosure
would be required it would not aid the case of the defense because informers are generally of such a class of people that their testimony can
easily be discredited on the stand. Roberts summarily dismissed this
argument by simply reasoning that under our adversary system of jurisprudence each side is the better judge of what will help, or what will not
help its cause. 3
In summary, it can be said that the decision in the present case follows
the trend in this area." Although Pennsylvania has no statute in this
area, 5 there is mention of the defendant's rights in this area in the
Pennsylvania Constitution. 6 Section 9 of the First Article to the Constitution states that, "In all criminal proceedings the accused hath, . . .
a right to meet witnesses face to face .

. . ."

However, case law inter-

preting the stated portion of the Constitution has construed this to mean
only that the defendant must be present when a witness testifies against
him. 7 California is a leading state which has followed the Roviaro reasoning. Chief Justice Traynor in People v. McShann 8 stated: "when it
appears from the evidence that the informer is a material witness on the
issue of guilt, and the accused seeks disclosure on cross-examination, the
People must either disclose his identity or incur a dismissal." 49 Thus
Pennsylvania has followed the California rationale, based on Roviaro,
and has set a standard to be used in deciding what the scope of the prosecution's duty to disclose the identity an eyewitness to the defense shall
be. Roberts stated that Roviaro was not technically binding upon them,
but conceded that the case had constitutional overtones.5 The supreme
court placed great emphasis on the principles relied on in Roviaro, and
those principles are the crux of Roberts' rationale. Roberts considered
these principles and the added factor of the single-observation identification by the policeman in reaching a conclusion. The rule in Pennsylvania would now appear to be that when an informer is the only "neutral
eyewitness"'" to an alleged criminal act, and his testimony could possibly
be crucial to the defendant then this informer's identity must be disclosed.
42. Id. at 64, 233 A.2d at 289.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id., 233 A.2d at 289-90.
See n.4 at 567 of 427 Pa. 53, and at 286 of 233 A.2d 284.
See n.1 infra.
PA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 348 Pa. 349, 35 A.2d (1941).
330 P.2d 33, 50 Cal. 2d 802 (1958).
330 P.2d at 36.
See n.4, at 57 of 427 Pa. 53, and at 286 of 233 A.2d 284.
Using the term "neutral" because of justice Roberts' statement at 62 of 427 Pa.
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In a recent California case, People v. Garcia,5 2 the disclosure of informer's identity doctrine was extended to include nonparticipating informers who had given the authorities the address of an apartment where
they had purchased narcotics. The majority (4-3) of the supreme court
based its holding on "fair trial" considerations. The court cited the
McShann case as stating that identity disclosure would not necessarily
be limited to those informers who took an active part in the commission
of the crime. In Garcia the supreme court stated that the accused could
force disclosure if he could "demonstrate a reasonable possibility that
the anonymous informants could give exonerating evidence on the issue
of guilt."5 3 This case would seem to open the way for further extensions
of the disclosure rule. The ramifications of a ruling that the prosecution
must disclose an informant are that disclosure must be made or the case
will be dismissed. The prosecution is very reluctant to disclose the identity of an informer because to do so might jeopardize his life in addition
to terminating his usefulness to the law enforcement agency. Thus decisions like Carter and Garcia will force the enforcement agencies to prepare their cases without the aid of informers in many instances, a difficult
task.
W. Bryan Pizzi II

CONTRACTS-WAIVER BY ESTOPPEL-Surrender by an insured of the right to change the beneficiary of his life insurance policy
creates a vested interest in the then designated beneficiary and an acceptance by the company of the insured's subsequent request to change the
beneficiary constitutes a waiver of the prohibition against such change
and an estoppel to deny liability to the new beneficiary.
INSURANCE

Phillips v. Continental Assurance Co., 210 Pa. Super. 178, 231 A.2d
422 (1967), allocatur denied, 231 A.2d 422 (1967).
Insured, in purchasing a life insurance policy, removed the provision
reserving to him the right to change beneficiaries and inserted instead
the provision that his policy be "without the right to revoke and change
any beneficiary." At the same time he designated A and B as beneficiaries of the policy. The defendant company agreed to his changes and
both signed the policy. Several years later insured requested defendant
to change the designated beneficiary of the policy from A and B to Regina
53, and at 288 of 233 A.2d 284, that police officers are so conditioned in their duties that
they cannot be objective witnesses, especially when their identification of a suspect is based
on one observation.
52. 2 CRanNAL LAW REPORTER 2307 (Calif. Sup. Ct. Dec. 7, 1967).
53. Id. at 2308.

